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Recent Criminal Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court:
The 2001-2002 Term
Charles H. Whitebread

T

he United States Supreme Court’s 2001-2002 term at least
gave the appearance of a more unified Supreme Court—
at least when compared to the previous term, which was
marked by an overwhelming number of 5-4 decisions—and
featured several unanimous or near unanimous decisions.
Specifically in the Fourth Amendment area, but also in other
cases, the Court seemed at times to break free from the typical
conservative-liberal divide that was so salient a year ago. This
term, the Court confronted significant issues regarding the
increased susceptibility to searches and seizures of bus passengers, students, and probationers; the death penalty and its limitations; the assistance of counsel in minor criminal cases; the
constitutionally required roles of the judge and jury in criminal cases; and further interpretation of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act.1

“bus passengers answer officers’ questions and otherwise
cooperate not because of coercion but because the passengers
know that their participation enhances their own safety and
the safety of those around them.” Ultimately, the Court
explained that it “has rejected in specific terms the suggestion
that police officers must always inform citizens of their right to
refuse when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless consent search.” Instead, it “has repeated that the totality of the
circumstances must control, without giving extra weight to the
absence of this type of warning.”

In a 6-3 decision, Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the
Court in United States v. Drayton,2 holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not require police officers to advise bus passengers of their right not to cooperate and to refuse to consent
to a search. Further, merely boarding a bus and questioning
passengers does not result in a seizure nor is a passenger’s consent to search made involuntary. The Court explained, “Law
enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching
individuals on the street or in other public places and putting
questions to them if they are willing to listen.” A person is not
seized as long as “a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter.” The Court cited Florida v. Bostick,3 which
“addressed the specific question of drug interdiction efforts on
buses.” In that case, the Court clarified here, “for the most
part per se rules are inappropriate in the Fourth Amendment
context,” which requires instead “a consideration of ‘all the circumstances surrounding the encounter.’” The confinement a
bus passenger feels is “the natural result of choosing to take
the bus,” and is not related to police conduct. Regarding the
encounter between police officers and bus passengers in the
present case, the Court asserted, “It is beyond question that
had this encounter occurred on the street, it would be constitutional. The fact that an encounter takes place on a bus does
not on its own transform standard police questioning of citizens into an illegal seizure.” Instead, the Court suggested,

In United States v. Arvizu,4 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for a unanimous Court, held that an appropriate application
of the totality of circumstances test considers facts collectively, rather than in isolation, and gives due weight to the factual inferences drawn by the law enforcement officer. In this
case, facts including a minivan’s travel on a primitive,
unpaved road typically used to circumvent a border patrol
checkpoint, at a time when the area is typically unpatrolled,
the driver’s stiff and rigid posture as he approached the border
patrol agent, and the subsequent “abnormal” behavior of the
child passengers “sufficed to form a particularized and objective basis for [the agent’s] stopping the vehicle, making the
stop reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.” The Court explained that reasonable suspicion
is determined on a case-by-case consideration of the totality of
the circumstances, which consequently “allows officers to
draw on their own experience and specialized training to
make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative
information available to them that ‘might well elude an
untrained person.’” The Court suggested that “it is quite reasonable that a driver’s slowing down, stiffening of posture,
and failure to acknowledge a sighted law enforcement officer
might well be unremarkable in one instance (such as a busy
San Francisco highway) while quite unusual in another (such
as a remote portion of rural southeastern Arizona).”
Accordingly, the officer’s “assessment of respondent’s reactions
upon seeing him and the children’s mechanical-like waving,
which continued for a full four to five minutes, were entitled
to some weight” and although “the facts suggested a family in
a minivan on a holiday outing[, a] determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of
innocent conduct.”

Footnotes
1. For a more in-depth review of the decisions of the past term, see
CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, RECENT DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT, 2001-2002 (Amer. Acad. of Jud. Educ. 2002).

2. 122 S.Ct. 2105 (2002).
3. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
4. 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for a unanimous
Court in United States v. Knights,5 holding a warrantless search
of a probationer’s apartment, supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation is reasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth
Amendment test of reasonableness balances “on the one hand,
the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual’s
privacy, and on the other, the degree to which it is needed for
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” The
Court explained, “Inherent in the very nature of probation is
that probationers ‘do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which
every citizen is entitled.’” Therefore, “a court granting probation may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the
offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.”
The Court also expressed its agreement with “‘the very
assumption of the institution of probation’. . . that the probationer ‘is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the
law.’” Consequently, the Court concluded, “When an officer
has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search
condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on
the probationer’s significantly diminished privacy interests is
reasonable.”

the procedure is more protective of the students’ privacy than
the procedure in Vernonia. The Court concluded that the
“invasion of students’ privacy is not significant.” Finally, the
Court considered “the nature and immediacy of the government’s concerns and the efficacy of the Policy in meeting
them.” Noting the importance of preventing drug use by
schoolchildren, and the presence of drug use at the Tecumseh
schools, the Court asserted that the policy was reasonable and
there was no need to create a threshold test to be met before a
drug testing program would be allowed. The Court stated that
“the safety interest furthered by drug testing is undoubtedly
substantial for all children, athletes and nonathletes alike.”
Ultimately, by enacting the policy, the school district has created a reasonably effective means of addressing its legitimate
concerns in “preventing, deterring, and detecting drug use.”
FIFTH AMENDMENT

The Court addressed suspicionless drug testing of students
who participate in extracurricular activities in Board of
Education of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County v. Earls.6 Justice Thomas, writing for the 5-4 majority,
held that the Student Activities Drug Testing Policy adopted by
the Tecumseh (Oklahoma) School District is a reasonable
means of furthering the school district’s interests and does not
violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court reasoned that the
Fourth Amendment “imposes no irreducible requirement of
[individualized] suspicion,” within the frame of safety and
administrative regulations, so “a search unsupported by probable cause may be reasonable when ‘special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’” The Court next discussed Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton7 in order to determine
what constitutes “special needs.” The Court in Vernonia held
that “suspicionless drug testing of athletes was constitutional.”
The Court not only determined that “special needs” is inherent in the public school context, but that “a finding of individualized suspicion may not be necessary when a school conducts drug testing.” In order to conduct drug testing in
schools, the Court balanced “the intrusion on the children’s
Fourth Amendment rights against the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.” The Court next uses the fact-specific
balancing approach in order to determine whether the policy
was constitutional. The Court explained that although the students in this situation are not athletes, as in Vernonia, “they
voluntarily subject themselves to many of the same intrusions
on their privacy as do athletes.” Therefore, students have a
limited expectation of privacy. The Court next suggested that

In a 5-4 decision, the Court in McKune v. Lile8 held that the
Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP) provided to convicted sex offenders in Kansas serves a vital penological purpose, and offering inmates minimal incentives to participate
does not amount to compelled self-incrimination prohibited
by the Fifth Amendment. The SATP lasts for 18 months and
involves daily counseling. Inmates address “sexual addiction;
understand the thoughts, feelings, and behavior dynamics that
precede their offenses; and develop relapse prevention skills.”
In order to take part in this program, respondent was required
to complete and sign a form, committing to discuss and accept
responsibility for the crime for which he has been sentenced.
A sexual history form that details prior sexual activities was
also required, regardless of whether these activities constitute
uncharged criminal offenses. Although the information
obtained for the SATP is not privileged, it does advance the
rehabilitative goals of the program. Kansas may use new evidence obtained from this process against sex offenders in
future criminal proceedings, as Kansas law requires uncharged
sexual offenses involving minors to be reported to law enforcement authority. Justice Kennedy, in a plurality opinion for four
justices, began his analysis by discussing the impact of sex
offenders on the nation. He noted that once convicted sex
offenders reenter society, they are more likely than any other
type of offender to be rearrested for a new sexual assault or
rape. The state, therefore, has a “vital interest in rehabilitating
convicted sex offenders.” The clinical rehabilitative programs
can be successful in reducing recidivism, and confronting one’s
past and accepting responsibility for one’s actions is an important part of that rehabilitation. Justice Kennedy opined that
the program does not create a compulsion for the inmates to
incriminate themselves since the consequences are not severe
enough to compel a prisoner to speak about past crimes
despite a desire to remain silent. This is partly due to the fact
that these consequences are imposed on prisoners instead of
regular citizens. Justice Kennedy pointed out that respondent’s
decision not to participate in SATP did not result in either an

5. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
6. 122 S.Ct. 2559 (2002).

7. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
8. 122 S.Ct. 2017 (2002).
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extension of his term of incarceration, or in his eligibility for
good-time credits or parole. Citing prior decisions, Kennedy
concluded that “the government need not make the exercise of
the Fifth Amendment privilege cost free.” Justice O’Connor
concurred in the judgment, concluding that “the alterations in
respondent’s prison conditions as a result of his failure to participate in [SATP] were [not] so great as to constitute compulsion” under the Fifth Amendment.
DUE PROCESS

Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court in United
States v. Ruiz,9 holding that the Constitution does not require
the government to disclose material impeachment evidence
prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant.
The Court evaluated the lawfulness of a “fast track” plea bargain process used by federal prosecutors in southern
California. The fast-track plea bargain offer “asks a defendant
to waive indictment, trial, and an appeal [and] in return, the
government agrees to recommend to the sentencing judge a
two-level departure downward from the otherwise applicable
United States Sentencing Guidelines sentence.” The Court
acknowledged that “a federal criminal defendant’s waiver of
the right to receive from prosecutors exculpatory impeachment material [is] a right that the Constitution provides as part
of its basic ‘fair trial’ guarantee.” However, “[w]hen a defendant pleads guilty he or she, of course, forgoes not only a fair
trial, but also other accompanying constitutional guarantees,”
such as the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as well as the right to confront one’s accusers and right to
a jury trial both provided by the Sixth Amendment.” Although
it recognized that “the more information the defendant has,
the more aware he is of the likely consequences of a plea,
waiver, or decision and the wiser that decision will likely be,”
the Court held that “the Constitution does not require the
prosecutor to share all useful information with the defendant.”
Instead, “the law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in
general in the circumstances—even though the defendant may
not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it.”
Often, the usefulness of impeachment information “will
depend upon the defendant’s own independent knowledge of
the prosecution’s potential case—a matter that the constitution
does not require prosecutors to disclose.” A right to pre-guilty
plea disclosure of impeachment information does not exist.
Such an additional safeguard not only has limited value, but
“could seriously interfere with the Government’s interest in
securing those guilty pleas that are factually justified, desired
by defendants, and help to secure the efficient administration
of justice.”
In United States v. Vonn,10 Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that a defendant who fails to make a
timely objection to a trial judge’s variance from the procedures

9. 122 S.Ct. 2450 (2002).
10. 122 S.Ct. 1043 (2002).
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required before accepting a guilty plea, as specified in Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, has the burden to
satisfy the plain-error rule on appeal. Further, “a reviewing
court may consult the whole record when considering the
effect of any error on substantial rights.” According to Rule
52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[t]he
Government avoids reversal of a criminal conviction by showing that trial error, albeit raised by a timely objection, affected
no substantial right of the defendant and was thus harmless.”
However, if a defendant fails to make a timely objection, Rule
52(b) allows that defendant to “nonetheless obtain reversal of
a conviction by carrying the converse burden, showing among
other things that plain error did affect his substantial rights.”
Rule 11(h), which tracks Rule 52(a), “is a separate harmlesserror rule applying only to errors committed under Rule 11,
the rule meant to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary, by laying out the steps a trial judge must take before
accepting such a plea.” There is no comparable plain error
rule, like that in Rule 52(b) in Rule 11(h). The Court cited
Congress’s Advisory Committee Notes, which explain that “by
1983 the practice of automatic reversal for error threatening
little prejudice to a defendant or disgrace to the legal system
prompted further revision of Rule 11.” Accordingly the harmless-error provision was added to Rule 11 because “[t]he committee said it was responding to the claim that the harmlesserror rule [of 52(a)] did not apply . . . [and] having pinpointed
that problem, it gave a pinpoint answer.” Consequently, it is
likely that Congress’s omission from Rule 11 of a plain-error
rule did not show its intention to exclude its applicability. The
Court maintained that if silent defendants were free from the
burden of plain-error review, “[a] defendant could simply relax
and wait to see if the sentence later struck him as satisfactory;
if not, his Rule 11 silence would have left him with clear but
uncorrected Rule 11 error to place on the Government’s shoulders.” Justice Stevens, dissenting in part, suggested, “It is . . .
perverse to place the burden on the uninformed defendant to
object to deviations from Rule 11 or to establish prejudice arising out of the judge’s failure to mention a right that he does not
know he has.”
SIXTH AMENDMENT

In Alabama v. Shelton,11 the Court held in a 5-4 decision that
the Sixth Amendment prevented imposition of a suspended
sentence that may end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty if the defendant was not accorded the “guiding
hand of counsel” in the prosecution for the crime charged.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, emphasized that the
Court’s Sixth Amendment analysis follows the “actual imprisonment standard,” which forbids imprisonment for any
offense of a person who was not represented by counsel at trial,
absent a knowing and intelligent waiver. Because suspended
sentences are prison terms imposed for the offense of conviction, when the prison term is triggered the defendant is incarcerated for the underlying offense rather than for a probation

11. 122 S.Ct. 1764 (2002).

violation. Such actual imprisonment for uncounseled convictions falls squarely within the Sixth Amendment’s prohibition.
The Court further indicated that the Constitution also bars
imposition of a suspended sentence that can never be enforced.
Justice Scalia, writing for the four dissenting justices, insisted
that actual imprisonment is the “touchstone of entitlement to
appointed counsel” and accused the majority of extending the
misdemeanor right to counsel “to cases bearing the mere threat
of imprisonment.” Thus, the dissent contended that suspended
sentences clearly do not invoke a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.
In Mickens v. Taylor,12 the Court addressed the Sixth
Amendment right to conflict-free representation in a murder
trial. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Scalia, the Court held
that in order to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation of
the right to counsel where a trial court failed to inquire into a
potential conflict of interest about which it reasonably should
have known, petitioner must “establish that the conflict of
interest affected his counsel’s performance” in order to void the
conviction. Although the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
mandates counsel that is effective in preserving the right to a
fair trial, defects in assistance that have no probable effect
upon the trial’s outcome do not establish a constitutional violation. The Court found that petitioner failed to demonstrate
in this case that counsel’s brief court-appointed representation
the previous week of the murder victim whom petitioner was
accused of killing affected his representation in the murder
trial. The highly fractured dissenting opinions (Justices
Stevens and Souter dissented separately and Justice Breyer
wrote in dissent for himself and Justice Ginsburg) appear to
agree that various categorical rules would be appropriate. They
disagreed whether these rules should free petitioners from
showing prejudice in cases of apparent unfairness or impose
upon the court a duty to enquire into potential conflicts of
interest about which it should know.

the distorting effects of hindsight.’” Consequently, “a defendant must overcome the ‘presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial
strategy.’” The Court recognized counsel’s “formidable task of
defending a client who had committed a horribly brutal and
senseless crime against two elderly persons in their home.”
Although the Court suggests that there were alternatives to the
attorney’s decision not to reemphasize respondent’s mental disease and drug addiction, his decision not to call or recall witnesses, and his waiver of a closing argument, the Court concluded that none of the alternatives “so clearly outweighs the
other that it was objectively unreasonable to . . . deem counsel’s choice . . . a tactical decision about which competent
lawyers might disagree.”
EIGHTH AMENDMENT –
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

In Hope v. Pelzer,15 the Court held 6-3 that handcuffing an
inmate to a hitching post or similar stationary object for a
length of time in excess of that necessary to quell a threat or
restore order is a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, said that any safety concerns had abated by
the time petitioner Hope was handcuffed to the hitching post
since he had already been subdued, handcuffed, placed in leg
irons, and transported back to the prison. The Court also
found the practice was punitive and created a substantial risk
of harm of which the officers were aware. The officials acted
with “deliberate indifference to the inmates’ health or safety”
since the “risk of harm [was] obvious.” The officers involved
were not entitled to qualified immunity at the summary judgment phase since Supreme Court precedent, a Justice
Department report, and Eleventh Circuit precedent gave a reasonable officer “fair and clear warning” that handcuffing Hope
to a hitching post in these circumstances was unlawful.
DEATH PENALTY AND APPRENDI

In an 8-1 decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court in Bell v. Cone,13 held that a defense counsel’s failure to
present any mitigating evidence or make a closing argument at
a capital sentencing proceeding was not ineffective assistance
of counsel, but instead a tactical trial decision. Rehnquist
relied upon Strickland v. Washington,14 which “announced a
two-part test for evaluating claims that a defendant’s counsel
performed so incompetently in his or her representation of a
defendant that the defendant’s sentence or conviction should
be reversed.” To satisfy this test, the defendant must prove
“both deficient performance and prejudice to the defense,”
which would then indicate that “counsel’s assistance was
defective enough to undermine confidence in a proceeding’s
result.” As it did in Strickland, the Court emphasized that
“‘[j]udicial scrutiny of a counsel’s performance must be highly
deferential’ and that ‘every effort [must] be made to eliminate

In a 6-3 decision, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in
Atkins v. Virginia,16 held that in light of the nation’s “evolving
standards of decency,” the execution of the mentally retarded
“is excessive and . . . the Constitution ‘places a substantive
restriction on the State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally
retarded offender.” Although “those mentally retarded persons
who meet the law’s requirements for criminal responsibility
should be tried and punished when they commit crimes,” the
Court said that due to their disabilities “they do not act with
the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct.” Consequently, their “impairments can jeopardize the reliability and fairness of capital proceedings against” them. The Court clarified that “the Eighth
Amendment succinctly prohibits ‘excessive’ sanctions” and
that “it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should
be graduated and proportioned to the offense.” The Court

12. 122 S.Ct. 1237 (2002).
13. 122 S.Ct. 1843 (2002).
14. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

15. 122 S.Ct. 2508 (2002).
16. 122 S.Ct. 2242 (2002).
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began its analysis by explaining that “the basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity
of man . . . [and therefore t]he Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.” In identifying these standards,
the “clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.” However, the Court concluded that “the Constitution
contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be
brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the
death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.” As an indication of the national consensus, the Court identified 18 states,
as well as the federal government, all having enacted legislation exempting mentally retarded offenders from execution: “It
is not so much the number of these States that is significant,
but the consistency of the direction of change.” Consequently,
this “provides powerful evidence that today society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the
average criminal.” In order to substantiate its support of this
“legislative consensus,” the Court urged that since the death
penalty has been reserved for “the most serious crimes . . . the
lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does
not merit that form of retribution.” Moreover, the same
impairments that exculpate mentally retarded offenders “also
make it less likely that they can process the information of the
possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control
their conduct based upon that information.”

as an alternative to the death penalty. The state court had held
Simmons inapplicable since the state’s statutes provide a possible sentence of 30 years instead of life without parole. The
Court rejected that argument with a reference to Shafer v.
South Carolina,19 which had explained that “under the South
Carolina sentencing scheme a jury now makes a sentencing
recommendation only if the jurors find the existence of an
aggravating circumstance such as a finding of potential future
dangerousness. When they do make a recommendation, their
only alternatives are death or life without parole.”
Responding to the state’s first point that the state supreme
court found Kelly’s future dangerousness not at issue in the
trial, the Court considered this finding “unsupportable on the
record before us.” The Court’s final discussion was a reiteration of the need to inform the jury of South Carolina’s sentencing scheme due to reasonable assumption that jurors may
not be sufficiently informed about the impossibility of parole.
The Court concluded that although “[t]he State stresses that
the judge told the jury that the terms ‘life imprisonment’ and
‘death sentence’ should be understood in their plain and ordinary meanings, . . . [w]e found these statements inadequate to
convey a clear understanding of Shafer’s parole ineligibility
and Kelly, no less than Shafer was entitled to his requested
jury instruction.”

In Kelly v. South Carolina,17 Justice Souter delivered the
opinion of the Court, which held 5-4 that when the only alternatives a jury is allowed to consider are death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, due process requires
that a jury be clearly informed of the defendant’s parole ineligibility. The decision was in keeping with the Court’s decision
in Simmons v. South Carolina,18 which held that the jury must
be informed of life incarceration without possibility of parole

In Ring v. Arizona,20 the Court revisited its decision upholding an Arizona sentencing statute in Walton v. Arizona.21 The
Court set out to determine Walton’s validity in light of the reasoning in Apprendi v. New Jersey.22 In a 7-2 decision, Justice
Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that
Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable. Overruling Walton, the
Court concluded that a sentencing judge sitting without a jury
is prohibited from finding an aggravating circumstance necessary for the imposition of the death penalty and since
“Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense’ the Sixth
Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.” The Walton
Court accepted that the aggravating factors in Arizona’s sentencing scheme were not “elements of the offense,” but rather
“ranked as ‘sentencing considerations’ guiding the choice
between life and death.” It therefore could not “conclude that
a State is required to denominate aggravating circumstances
‘elements’ of the offense or permit only a jury to determine the
existence of such circumstances.” Ten years later, in Apprendi,
the Court “held that the Sixth Amendment does not permit a
defendant to be ‘expose[d] . . . to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive in the jury verdict alone.” Attempting
to reconcile its decision with Walton, the Apprendi Court
focused on “[t]he key distinction . . . that a conviction of firstdegree murder in Arizona carried a maximum sentence of
death.” For this reason, “[o]nce a jury has found the defendant
guilty of all the elements of an offense which carries as its maximum penalty the sentence of death, it may be left to the judge
to decide whether that maximum penalty, rather than a lesser

17. 534 U.S. 246 (2002).
18. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
19. 532 U.S. 36 (2001).

20. 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002).
21. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
22. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

In Justice Scalia’s lengthy dissent, he criticized the lack of
support for the Court’s decision and exclaimed, “Seldom has
an opinion of this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but
the personal views of its members.” He argued that “the arrogance of [the Court’s] assumption of power takes one’s breath
away.” Scalia suggested that “it will rarely if ever be the case
that the Members of this Court will have a better sense of the
evolution in views of the American people than do their
elected representatives.” Revealing that the oldest of the
Court’s cited statutes is 14 years old, Scalia warned that
“reliance upon ‘trends,’ even those of much longer duration
than a mere 14 years, is a perilous basis for constitutional adjudication.” He concluded, “As long as a mentally retarded
offender knows ‘the difference between right and wrong’ . . .
only the sentencer can assess whether his retardation reduces
his culpability enough to exempt him from the death penalty
for the particular murder in question.”
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one, ought to be imposed.” However, the Court now recognizes that the Apprendi dissent more accurately described
Arizona’s sentencing scheme when it explained that a “[d]efendant’s death sentence required the judge’s factual findings.”
Following “Apprendi’s instruction that ‘the relevant inquiry is
one not of form, but of effect,” the Court acknowledged, “In
effect, ‘the required finding [of an aggravated circumstance]
exposed [Ring] to a greater punishment than that authorized
by the jury’s guilty verdict.” As the Court said, “Apprendi
repeatedly instructs . . . that the characterization of a fact or
circumstance as an ‘element’ or a ‘sentencing factor’ is not
determinative of the question ‘who decides,’ judge or jury.”
Finally, the Court concluded, “Although ‘the doctrine of stare
decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law’ . . . our
precedents are not sacrosanct.” Instead, the Court has “overruled prior decisions where the necessity and propriety of
doing so has been established.”
OTHER APPRENDI ISSUES

In United States v. Cotton,23 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for a unanimous Court, held that a federal indictment’s failure
to include an alleged drug quantity involved in a conspiracy,
which results in an enhanced statutory maximum sentence,
make the enhanced sentence erroneous under Apprendi v. New
Jersey,24 but that the “error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings,”
and therefore did not rise to the level of plain error to be corrected by the appellate court. According to the plain-error test
of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), an appellate
court can correct an error not raised at trial if only if there is
an “error” that is “plain,” affects substantial rights, and “the
error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Even though the parties agree
that omitting the drug quantity from the indictment was an
error that was plain, and the Court assumes the error did
affect substantial rights, “the error did not seriously affect the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” The Court said that the “overwhelming” and “essentially uncontroverted” evidence included numerous state
arrests and seizures, a federal search, and the trial testimony
of two cooperating co-conspirators and the Court ultimately
concluded, “Surely the grand jury, having found that the conspiracy existed, would have also found that the conspiracy
involved at least 50 grams of cocaine base.” Ultimately, the
Court stressed, “the fairness and integrity of the criminal justice system depends on meting out to those inflicting the
greatest harm on society the most severe punishments.”
Therefore, “The real threat . . . to the ‘fairness, integrity, and
public reputation of judicial proceedings’ would be if respondents, despite the overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence
that they were involved in a vast drug conspiracy, were to
receive a sentence prescribed for those committing less substantial drug offenses because of an error that was never
objected to at trial.”

23. 122 S.Ct. 1781 (2002).
24. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
25. 122 S.Ct. 2406 (2002).

The Court in Harris v. United States,25 set out to determine
whether or not brandishing a firearm under 18 U.S.C.
§924(c)(1)(A) is a sentencing factor or an element of a separate crime and to identify the validity of McMillan v.
Pennsylvania,26 after the Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New
Jersey.27 In McMillan, the Court had “sustained a statute that
increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not
beyond the statutory maximum, when the sentencing judge
found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant
had possessed a firearm.” In Apprendi, the Court held that
“other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum . . . must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.” In the present case, Justice
Kennedy writing for a 5-4 majority held, “as a matter of statutory interpretation, §924(c)(1)(A) defines a single offense . . .
[and] regards brandishing and discharging as sentencing factors to be found by the judge, not offense elements to be found
by the jury.” Then, writing for a four-member plurality (not
joined by Justice Breyer, who helped to form the five-member
majority), Justice Kennedy tried to reconcile McMillan and
Apprendi: “Read together McMillan and Apprendi mean that
those facts setting the outer limits of a sentence, and of the
judicial power to impose it, are the elements of the crime for
the purposes of the constitutional analysis,” and judicial discretion within the range authorized by the jury verdict may be
narrowed “by requiring defendants to serve minimum terms
after judges make certain factual findings.” Justice Breyer
refused to join the plurality in reconciling McMillan and
Apprendi, but nonetheless agreed that Apprendi did not apply to
mandatory minimum sentences.
Justice Kennedy began his analysis in Harris by stating,
“Federal laws usually list all offense elements ‘in a single sentence’ and separate the sentencing factors ‘into subsections.’”
In §924(c)(1)(A), the initial paragraph lists the elements of a
complete crime, but “toward the end of the paragraph is the
word ‘shall,’ which often divides offense-defining provisions
from those that specify sentences.” Separate subsections follow the word “shall” and incrementally increase the minimum
penalty, yet do not repeat the elements stated in the principal
paragraph. Based on this structure, Kennedy feels confident in
“presum[ing] that its principal paragraph defines a single
crime and its subsections identify sentencing factors.” Further,
“[t]he incremental changes in the minimum—from 5 years, to
7, to 10—are precisely what one would expect to see in provisions meant to identify matters for the sentencing judge’s consideration.” Although sentencing factors “cannot swell the
penalty above what the law has provided for the acts charged
against the prisoner,” Kennedy observed, “[a]t issue in
Apprendi, by contrast was a sentencing factor that did ‘swell the
penalty above what the law has provided,’. . . and thus functioned more like a ‘traditional element.’” The Apprendi Court
“made clear that its holding did not affect McMillan at all: ‘We

26. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
27. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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do not overrule McMillan. We limit its holding to cases that do
not involve the imposition of a sentence more severe than the
statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury’s
verdict—a limitation identified in the McMillan opinion
itself.’” Kennedy emphasized, “The judge may impose the
minimum, the maximum, or any other sentence within the
range without seeking further authorization from those
juries—and without contradicting Apprendi.”
Justice Thomas, writing for the four dissenting justices in
Harris, said that “McMillan . . . conflicts with the Court’s later
decision in Apprendi,” and, he suggested, “[t]he Court’s holding today therefore rests on either a misunderstanding or a
rejection of the very principles that animated Apprendi just two
years ago.” He stressed, “As a matter of common sense, an
increased mandatory minimum heightens the loss of liberty
and represents the increased stigma society attaches to the
offense. Consequently, facts that trigger an increased mandatory minimum sentence warrant constitutional safeguards.”
Thomas contended that Apprendi stood for the principle that
“when a fact exposes a defendant to greater punishment than
what is otherwise legally prescribed, that fact is ‘by definition
[an] element of a separate legal offense.’” Thus, “there are no
logical grounds for treating facts triggering mandatory minimums any differently than facts that increase the statutory
maximum.”
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS

In another 5-4 decision, Justice Breyer delivered the opinion
of the Court in Carey v. Saffold,28 holding that under
§2244(d)(2) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the term “pending” covers the time
between a lower state court’s decision and the filing of a notice
of appeal to a higher state court, an interval during which the
time period for seeking federal habeas corpus relief is tolled.
Relying on the dictionary definition of the word “pending” the
Court determines that it means “through the period of continuance . . . of” or “until the . . . completion of.” The Court
therefore concluded that “until the application has achieved
final resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedures,
by definition it remains ‘pending.’” In Justice Kennedy’s dissent, he criticized the Court’s assertion “that an application is
pending as long as the ordinary state collateral review process
is ‘in continuance,’” because “that is only true, of course, if
‘application’ means the ‘ordinary state collateral review
process,’ a proposition that finds no support” in the dictionary.
He argued that when the word “application” is used in the laws
governing federal habeas corpus, “it is clear that the statute
refers to a specific legal document.” However, he contended
that the Court’s holding “gives ‘application’ a new meaning
. . . that embraces the multiple petitions, appeals, and other filings that constitute the ‘ordinary state collateral review
process.’”

28. 122 S.Ct. 2134 (2002).
29. 534 U.S. 362 (2002).
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In a 6-3 decision, Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of
the Court in Lee v. Kemna,29 holding that the failure to comply
with state rules stipulating the requirements for continuance
motions, in extraordinary cases, does not constitute state
grounds adequate to bar federal habeas review. Generally, the
Court “will not take up a question of federal law presented in a
case ‘if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state law
ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate
to support the judgment . . . whether the state-law ground is
substantive or procedural.’” However, “there are . . . exceptional
cases in which exorbitant application of a generally sound rule
renders the state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a
federal question.” In this case, the Court found that noncompliance with Missouri Supreme Court Rules 24.09 and 24.10,
which designate requirements for continuance motions, did not
procedurally default petitioner’s claim. Focusing specifically on
Rule 24.10, the Court acknowledged that it, “like other state
and federal rules of its genre, serves a governmental interest of
undoubted legitimacy . . . designed to arm trial judges with the
information needed to rule reliably on a motion to delay a
scheduled criminal trial.” But in this case “the Rule’s essential
requirements . . . were substantially met.” In Justice Kennedy’s
dissent, he argued that “[a]lmost every case presents unique circumstances that cannot be foreseen and articulated by prior
decisions, and general rules like Rule 24.10 are designed to
eliminate second-guessing about the rule’s applicability in special cases.” Moreover, “[a]ll requirements of a rule are, in the
rulemaker’s view, essential to fulfill its purposes; imperfect compliance is thus, by definition, not compliance at all.”
In Horn v. Banks,30 the Court addressed the necessity of
undertaking the analysis identified in Teague v. Lane31 in a hearing for federal habeas corpus relief when the state properly
raises the issue. In a per curiam decision, the Court held that
the inquiries in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA) and Teague are distinct, and that the threshold
question in every habeas case is whether the court is obligated
to apply the Teague rule to the defendant’s claim. The Teague
Court had explained that new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure will not be applicable to those cases that have
become final before the new rules are announced, unless they
fall within an exception to the general rule. After respondent
Banks’s first-degree murder conviction had been directly
appealed, the Supreme Court decided a case that he claimed
applied to his conviction. Because the government raised the
question of retroactivity in the district and intermediate appellate court, the Court must apply the Teague analysis before considering the merits of the claim. The Court stressed that the
Teague analysis is distinct from AEDPA standards of review and
continues in force independent of, and subsequent to, the passage of the AEDPA. Thus, in addition to performing any analysis required by AEDPA, a federal court considering a habeas
petition must conduct a threshold Teague analysis when the
issue is properly raised by the state.

30. 122 S.Ct. 2147 (2002).

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for an 8-1 majority in Bell
v. Cone,32 held a federal habeas petition challenging specific
aspects of an attorney’s representation is governed by
Strickland v. Washington33 and survives only if the petitioner
proves that the state court’s decision is either “contrary to” or
involves “an unreasonable application of clearly established
Federal law” under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). The Court began
by explaining that a federal writ may be issued “under the ‘contrary to’ clause if the state court applies a rule different from
the governing law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case
differently than we have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Alternatively, a writ may be issued “under the
‘unreasonable application’ clause if the state court correctly
identifies the governing legal principle from our decisions but
unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case.” The
Court stressed that “an unreasonable application is different
from an incorrect one.” Respondent in this case argued that
his ineffective assistance claim was governed by United States
v. Cronic,34 which “identified three situations implicating the
right to counsel that involved circumstances ‘so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.’” The three situations were: a “complete denial of counsel” at a “critical stage”; where “counsel
entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful
adversarial testing”; and “where counsel is called upon to render assistance under circumstances where competent counsel
very likely could not.” Respondent only claims that by
“fail[ing] to ‘mount some case for life’ after the prosecution
introduced evidence in the sentencing hearing and gave a closing statement,” his attorney failed to subject prosecution’s case
to meaningful adversarial testing at the sentencing phase and
therefore prejudice should have been presumed. However, the
Court explained that in Cronic it used the word “entirely” to
indicate “that the attorney’s failure must be complete.”
Respondent fails to make this showing since he does not argue
“that his counsel failed to oppose the prosecution throughout
the sentencing proceeding as a whole, but that his counsel
failed to do so at specific points.” The Court said that the attor-

ney’s failure in this case to adduce mitigating evidence at sentencing and his waiver of a closing argument “are of the same
ilk as other specific attorney errors we have held subject to
Strickland’s performance and prejudice components.”
Ultimately, the Court also concluded that the state court’s
application of Strickland was not an “unreasonable” one when
it determined that the defense counsel’s “performance was
within the permissible range of competency.”

31. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
32. 122 S.Ct. 1843 (2002).

33. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
34. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).

CONCLUSION

Although the Court’s death penalty cases have received the
most publicity, their significance for the future pails in comparison to the practical effect of the Court’s decisions regarding
assistance of counsel in minor criminal cases and the increased
deference afforded law enforcement officers in making
searches and seizures. Also, the Court’s decisions clarifying
and solidifying Apprendi v. New Jersey will undoubtedly have
far-reaching influence on how routine criminal cases are conducted. While the 5-4 ideological split remains an ever-present
feature of this Supreme Court, many more significant decisions
than last term, specifically in the Fourth Amendment context,
seem to be less susceptible of change as a result of any Court
appointments that may take place in the near future. This is
not only due to the more unified appearance of the Court at
times, but also to the atypical divisions in numerous cases.
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